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INFERRING PREVIOUSLY
UNINSTALLED APPLICATIONS FROM
DIGITAL TRACES
Jim Jones†, Tahir Khan†, Kathryn Laskey†, Alex Nelson‡,
Mary Laamanen‡, and Douglas White‡
†George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia, United States
‡National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, Maryland, United States

ABSTRACT
In this paper, we present an approach and experimental results to suggest the past presence
of an application after the application has been uninstalled and the system has remained
in use. Current techniques rely on the recovery of intact artifacts and traces, e.g., whole
files, Windows Registry entries, or log file entries, while our approach requires no intact
artifact recovery and leverages trace evidence in the form of residual partial files. In the case
of recently uninstalled applications or an instrumented infrastructure, artifacts and traces
may be intact and complete. In most cases, however, digital artifacts and traces are altered, destroyed, and disassociated over time due to normal system operation and deliberate
obfuscation activity. As a result, analysts are often presented with partial and incomplete
artifacts and traces from which defensible conclusions must be drawn. In this work, we
match the sectors from a hard disk of interest to a previously constructed catalog of full
files captured while various applications were installed, used, and uninstalled. The sectors
composing the files in the catalog are not necessarily unique to each file or application, so
we use an inverse frequency-weighting scheme to compute the inferential value of matched
sectors. Similarly, we compute the fraction of full files associated with each application that
is matched, where each file with a sector match is weighted by the fraction of total catalog
sectors matched for that file. We compared results using both the sector-weighted and fileweighted values for known ground truth test images and final snapshot images from the M57
Patents Scenario data set. The file-weighted measure was slightly more accurate than the
sector-weighted measure, although both identified all of the uninstalled applications in the
test images and a high percentage of installed and uninstalled applications in the M57 data
set, with minimal false positives for both sets. The key contribution of our work is the suggestion of uninstalled applications through weighted measurement of residual file fragments.
Our experimental results indicate that past application activity can be reliably indicated
even after an application has been uninstalled and the host system has been rebooted and
used. The rapid and reliable indication of previously uninstalled applications is useful for
cyber defense, law enforcement, and intelligence operations.
Keywords: digital forensics; digital artifact; digital trace; partial artifact; residual artifact;
uninstalled application
c 2016 ADFSL
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INTRODUCTION

The practice of digital forensics is the art and
science of inferring and proving past activity
given some set of residual digital artifacts
and traces. These artifacts and traces may
be files, Windows Registry entries, log entries, memory contents, network traffic, etc.,
and past activity of interest may be legitimate and illegitimate user activity, system
activity, application installation and usage,
malware infection and operation, etc. While
whole artifacts may be recoverable in some
cases, many situations require inferring and
proving past activity given residual partial
artifacts and traces. We propose that past
activity, specifically application installation
and usage, can be reliably suggested from
digital traces, even when the application in
question has been uninstalled and usage of
the system and media has continued. We assume that full artifacts created by an activity degrade monotonically and non-linearly
over time. Specifically, files created as a consequence of application installation, usage,
and uninstallation are subsequently deleted,
and some sectors from these deleted files will
be overwritten while other sectors may persist on the digital media. Given prior knowledge of the full file artifacts created by an application, we can then search media of interest for traces in the form of matching partial
artifacts, i.e., sectors from the original full
artifact, and reason over these matches to
suggest past application presence. Our approach complements existing methods that
rely on evidence from intact full-file artifacts,
an uncleansed Windows Registry, intact log
entries, or traces from other sources such as
memory contents or network traffic.
In the sections that follow, we discuss prior
work in this area, then we describe the two
core elements of our approach: (i) building
a catalog of sectors associated with specific
applications, and (ii) reasoning over sectors
Page 114

that match entries in that catalog. Subsequent sections present our experimental results against a test set with known ground
truth and the M57 Patents Scenario (Woods
et al., 2011) disk images, for which we have
some ground truth. We close the paper with
a summary of our conclusions, limitations of
this approach, and future research plans.

2.

RELATED WORK

Related work to establish the presence of installed and uninstalled applications has generally relied on intact file artifacts (Koppen et al., 2013; Quick et al., 2013), log
file analysis (Forte, 2004), and examination of the Windows Registry when available (Laamanen et al., 2014; Nelson et al.,
2014; Wong, 2007). Additional techniques
and methods rely on traces such as email
addresses, URLs, etc. extracted from raw
data (Garfinkel, 2013), or data structures
and other known-layout data from memory
(Ligh et al., 2014). Intact file artifacts for
uninstalled applications may be files remaining from an aborted or poorly written uninstall application, or may be user files which
are created during application use and are
deliberately not deleted as part of the application uninstall process, such as user preference files. Log files include varying levels
of detail depending on the application creating the log, and establishing the integrity
of the log file requires secure creation, transmission, and storage of the log file. Registry artifacts may include application specific keys as well as command line execution
arguments, recently accessed files, and similar indicators of application installation and
usage, whether the application in question
has been uninstalled or not. In contrast, our
work does not require recovery of any intact
artifacts and is specifically designed to suggest applications that have been uninstalled.
Our work relies on recovery and analysis
c 2016 ADFSL
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of file fragments in the form of disk sectors.
Collange, Dandass, Daumas, and Defour
(Collange et al., 2009), Garfinkel, Nelson,
White, and Roussev (Garfinkel et al., 2010),
and later Young, Foster, Garfinkel, and Fairbanks (Young et al., 2012) and Foster (Foster, 2012) examined sector content uniqueness as it relates to specific file identification.
This initial work successfully identified files
with distinct content, such as videos, from
a limited number of sectors, but the later
work also hinted at issues with sector content common across multiple files. These issues fully emerged in the work of Garfinkel
and McCarrin (Garfinkel et al., 2015) in the
form of “common data structures found in
Microsoft Office documents and multimedia
files.” Garfinkel and McCarrin label such file
fragments “non-probative blocks” and developed heuristics to account for these blocks
and reliably detect file presence from fragments. By comparison, we are inferring the
past presence of applications based on blocks
from multiple files. Further, our approach
pre-selects potentially probative blocks then
weights matching blocks based on their frequency in our catalog.

3.

APPROACH AND
METHODOLOGY

The theory underpinning our approach is
that application installation and use creates
files, and application uninstallation deletes
these files. The sectors containing the contents of these deleted files are overwritten
over time, but some sectors may remain intact until subsequent examination. These
residual sectors, or traces, may be used to
infer the likelihood that a particular application was previously installed on the examined system.
It is important to note that just because
we empirically establish that an application
installation and use creates a specific set of
c 2016 ADFSL
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files and corresponding sectors, this does not
imply that the presence of these sectors or
even intact files proves the current or past
presence of the application in question. That
is, if I know A causes B and I subsequently
find B, I cannot logically conclude that A
occurred. On the other hand, if A is established to be the only possible cause of B, then
I can logically conclude that the presence of
B does prove A. In the context of files and
associated sectors, prior research (Garfinkel
et al., 2010)(Garfinkel and McCarrin, 2015)
showed that while a sector may not have only
one possible producer, in practice it is likely
to have only one, especially for high entropy
sectors. In our work, a pre-processing step
removes sectors appearing in our clean OS
images, sectors with low entropy, and sectors
appearing more than 100 times in our initial catalog, thereby removing sectors known
to be produced by, or likely produced by,
other processes. Further, we weigh the influence of sectors based on the number of
different catalog applications in which they
appear. In practice, this is accomplished by
our Inverse Document Frequency weight described below. Finally, we note that we are
not proving the past presence of an application. Rather, we are suggesting an increased
likelihood that a particular application was
present at some past time, where proof to
the standard required by the circumstances
would have to be obtained from additional
evidence.
Our approach, summarized in Figure 1,
reasons over media sectors that match entries in a catalog associating sectors with
specific application activities. The catalog
was created for 16 Windows applications in
a controlled environment using virtual machine snapshots. Catalog entries are postprocessed to remove less useful sectors and
to assess each sector’s potential inferential
value. We then match sectors from a digital
storage device of interest, e.g., a hard drive,
Page 115
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to the entries in the catalog and compute
weighted measures that represent the likelihood that the associated application was
previously installed on the media of interest.

+ Close + Uninstall + Reboot) in Figure 3.
Diskprints are created with shared baseline
states, by rolling the virtual machine state
back to a common point before applications
were installed, in order to isolate effects of
the operating system.

Figure 1. Approach Overview

3.1

Catalog Creation and
Post-processing

We are leveraging the NIST Diskprinting effort (Laamanen et al., 2014) to collect application traces. Diskprinting uses virtual machine snapshots to record the state of a system before and after an action of interest.
Each snapshot together with captured network traffic is called a slice. A series of slices,
which reflect sequential activities regarding a
single application, is called a diskprint. The
contents of two adjacent snapshots may then
be compared to extract differences (Figure
2). For our purposes, the file systems of
adjacent snapshots are compared to identify new, modified, or deleted files. For the
NIST diskprinting data, these activities are
application Install, Open, Close, Uninstall,
and system Reboot (indicated as I, O, C,
U, and R in Figure 3). Diskprints are made
up of sequential and cumulative slices, hence
the nomenclature B (Base), BI (Base + Install), ..., BIOCUR (Base + Install + Open
Page 116

Figure 2. Slices and differencing

Figure 3. A diskprint is a series of related
slices
c 2016 ADFSL
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We use 29 application diskprints of the
NIST diskprint data (NIST, 2015), representing 16 applications across one or more
different Windows platforms (Table 1) plus
three clean Operating System diskprints:
one WinXP and two Win7. The applications
were selected in part to facilitate subsequent
testing against the M57 Patents Scenario images.
Table 1. NIST Diskprints

CDFSL Proceedings 2016

We discard these sub-512 byte sector hashes
since they will never match our media of
interest hashes, which are always based on
a full 512-byte sector hash. We have discussed but not implemented padding sub512 byte diskprint fragments with zeros prior
to computing the MD5 hash. We process
the diskprint sector hash data as described
in the following paragraphs and ingest the
data into a hashdb (NPS-DEEP, 2015) instance.
Table 2. Keyword Whitelist

Each NIST Diskprint slice contains a
snapshot of the system hard disk in the form
of a VMDK file. For each pair of adjacent slices, we computed file differences and
512-byte sector-aligned MD5 hashes for each
new or modified file (Garfinkel et al., 2012).
For experimental purposes, we used MD5s
because of their smaller bit count and acceptable impact of false positives from MD5
weaknesses (Dandass et al., 2008). However,
an operational deployment of this research
would need to employ a more secure cryptographic hash per NIST guidelines on hash
selection (NIST, 2012). The diskprint sector hash data currently computes the final
sector hash of each file based on file extant
vs. padding the final sub-sector fragment
with zeros and computing a 512-byte hash.
c 2016 ADFSL

Application
Adv Keylogger
Chrome
Eraser
Firefox
HxD hex editor
Invisible Secrets
MS Office
Python
Safari
Sdelete
Thunderbird
TrueCrypt
UPX
WinRar
WinZip
Wireshark

keywords
keylogger
chrome,google
eraser
firefox,mozilla
hxd
“invisible secrets”
office,“microsoft shared”
python
safari
sdelete
thunderbird
truecrypt
upx
winrar
winzip
wireshark

File differencing as implemented on the
diskprint data has the potential to capture
spurious traces, i.e., file differences that are
not related to the activity in question but
are the product of unrelated system activity.
We describe this property of a file as attribution, where positive attribution means a file
is a result of the activity in question, negative
attribution means the file is not the result of
the activity in question, and marginal attribution means the file is due to the activity in
question but in a non-probative way (such as
the $BitMap or pagefile.sys files on a WinPage 117
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dows system).
Positive attribution is determined by
keyword searching of the filename and
path associated with each sector hash.
This information is stored in files using differentially-annotated Digital Forensics
XML, or DFXML (Garfinkel, 2012; Nelson
et al., 2014)), a language that associates
file system metadata with file content summaries, including file paths, full-file hashes,
and sector-level hashes. The DFXML language facilitates interaction between tools,
such as those used in our processing steps.
For each application, sector hashes whose
source file paths contain matching keywords
from Table 2 are retained. Keywords were
derived by examining string frequencies in
the collective file path names for each application and selecting the most common, subject to human review.
For example, whitelisting the Firefox19
on 64-bit Windows 7 (Win7x64) diskprint
reduced trace files from 1,054 to 289,
and reduced associated sector hashes from
16,096,960 to 157,530. This whitelisting approach is something of a blunt instrument,
yet we obtain good results in our subsequent
experiments. In the section on future work,
we propose alternative catalog construction
techniques to increase the quality of collected file fragments (sectors).
Sector hashes, including those from files
with positive attribution, are not necessarily
unique. We describe this property of a sector as its frequency, where distinct means the
sector only occurs once in the post-processed
diskprint data, application common means
the sector occurs in one or more application diskprints but not elsewhere, and global
means the sector occurs outside of the application diskprints (i.e., in the baseline OS
states).
We limit sector hash value frequency in
the hashdb instance to 100. While somewhat
arbitrary, this limit allows for some multiPage 118

application or multi-print hashes to remain
while removing hashes not likely to have discriminatory value and keeping the hashdb to
a manageable size. If desired, we can later
select hash values below the f=100 threshold,
or we can reprocess the original diskprint
sector hash data if results indicate that sector hashes with frequency greater than 100
have inferential value.
As a practical matter, hashdb supports
a maximum frequency parameter when the
hashdb instance is created. However, this
only prevents the addition of more hash values which have already reached the maximum frequency - it does not remove the hash
value from the hashdb instance. To prevent
undesired effects on our subsequent calculations, we set a maximum frequency of 101
prior to ingest, then we remove all hashes
with frequency of 101 after ingest is complete. Without this extra step, the catalog
would contain all sector hashes in the original data and all sector hashes with frequency
greater than 100 would be retained with frequency equal to 101, regardless of the actual frequency of these sector hashes. With
this extra step, the catalog contains sector
hashes with accurate frequency counts, and
only sector hashes with actual frequencies of
100 or less.
Certain low entropy sector contents, such
as all zeros or all ones, occur with high frequency in many sources and have no discriminatory value. For example, the following
sector hashes with the noted content occur
thousands or millions of times in the original
NIST diskprint sector hash data.
# repeated 00
bf619eac0cdf3f68d496ea9344137e8b
# repeated 01
393a0fa0f348fb03871ab93726057ddc
# repeated FF
de03fe65a6765caa8c91343acc62cffc
# repeated 00; 06 @offset 510
c 2016 ADFSL
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c5d77850e62433f25d5496bfad94c1b2
These sector hashes would be removed
by our maximum frequency processing step
above. However, we filter these sector hashes
out at an earlier processing stage simply to
speed up subsequent processing.
The NIST diskprint data includes
diskprints of non-application activities
on three operating system variants: two
WinXP and one Win7x64. Any hash value
appearing in these base OS diskprints does
not have discriminatory value for a subsequently installed application, so we remove
these hash values from the hashdb instance.
As a practical matter, this was accomplished
by using hashdb’s add repository command
to build a hashdb instance of all OS hash
values, then using hashdb’s subtract hash
command to remove those hash values from
the original hashdb instance.
The combined whitelist and frequency
limit processing resulted in an overall file
count of 99,227 and sector hash count of
44,677,825 (file and sector hash counts before
whitelist and frequency limits were not computed). Removing the base OS diskprint sector hash values reduced the overall file count
to 20,239 and sector hash count to 7,933,265.
To facilitate later calculations of application likelihood, we count and store the total
sector hashes and total files per application
in the final catalog. These totals (Table 3)
are extracted from the final noise-reduced
hashdb instance using hashdb’s hash table
command (v.1.0.0 and prior) with subsequent grep expressions (for hash totals) and
hashdb’s sources command with subsequent
grep expressions (for file totals). These totals are for all slices in each diskprint, where
each diskprint contains 5-6 slices. 5-slice
diskprints result from applications where the
“Open” and “Close” steps were combined as
a single “Run” step.
c 2016 ADFSL
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3.2

Image Processing

Media of interest is assumed to be
a raw image of a hard disk or similar.
We use the md5deep tool
(https://github.com/jessek/hashdeep)
to compute sector-aligned 512-byte MD5
hashes for the entire disk or disk image,
storing the results in a DFXML file. We
then use hashdb’s scan expanded comTable 3.
diskprint

Total hashes & files per app

Diskprint
AdvKeylogger-WinXP
Chrome28-W7x32
Chrome28-W7x64
Chrome28-WinXP
eraser-W7x32
Firefox19-W7x32
Firefox19-W7x64
Firefox19-WinXP
HxD171-W7x32
InvSecrets21-WinXP
OfficePro2003-W7x32
OfficePro2003-W7x64
OfficePro2003-WinXP
Python264-WinXP
Safari157-W7x32
Safari157-W7x64
Safari157-WinXP
sdelete-W7x32
sdelete-W7x64
Thunderbird2-WinXP
TrueCrypt63-WinXP
UPX-W7x32
UPX-W7x64
Winrar5beta-W7x32
Winrar5beta-W7x64
Winzip17pro-W7x32
Winzip17pro-W7x64
Wireshark-W7x32
Wireshark-W7x64
TOTALS

Hashes
4,716
686,986
670,051
1,035,098
69,984
103,341
106,270
96,377
4,774
6,689
1,090,216
1,077,126
656,354
86,287
316,224
569,645
343,824
642
642
68,102
24,520
1,796
1,813
9,196
18,328
240,229
262,854
171,515
209,666
7,933,265

Files
23
669
499
624
24
132
146
115
12
19
3,800
3,804
2,801
2,355
907
1,504
918
5
4
172
16
19
19
41
81
149
153
617
611
20,239
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mand (v1.0.0) to identify hash values in
the DFXML file that match hash values
from the hashdb instance. The hashdb
scan expanded command output includes
the file source and repository information
from the hashdb instance. We require these
details, as we are using the repository name
to hold the diskprint (application) identifier,
and the source file information allows us to
compute which files in the catalog, and how
much of each file, is matched. Matches are
written to an interim text file.
The matches text file is processed to
compute the various measures of diskprint
matching, i.e., application presence. Output includes the number and fraction of distinct hashes matched for each diskprint (application), the number and fraction of total
files matched for each diskprint where a file
match is declared if one or more hash values from that file are matched. Output also
includes weighted versions of these two measures, which are discussed below.
After we eliminated weak or non-probative
sector hash values in our noise reduction
process, we then applied weights to matching sector hashes based on their occurrence
across applications, i.e., their frequency in
the catalog. A sector hash that occurs in N
different diskprinted applications is weighted
with a factor 1/N (this is the hyperbolic formulation of Inverse Document Frequency described by Zobel and Moffat (Zobel et al.,
1998)). A sector hash value that occurs in
only one diskprinted application is weighted
1/1=1.0; a sector hash value that occurs in 2
different diskprinted applications is weighted
1/2=0.5; and so on. This calculation is
shown in Equation 1 below, where WSP is
weighted sector %, NSM is the number of
sector matches, and the subscript DP indicates “per diskprint”. The results of this calculation are in Appendix A under the heading w sector% (weighted sector %). In this
calculation, each matching sector for a given
Page 120

diskprint is weighted by its inverse frequency
in the catalog; these weighted matching sector counts are then summed and divided by
the total number of sectors in the catalog for
that diskprint to give a weighted sector % for
that diskprint.
NSM
X

WSPDP =

S=1

1
freqS

sectors totalDP

(1)

Instead of declaring a file present if one
or more hash values from that file are found
(as the data in Appendix A under the heading “files found” does), we next compute
the percent of each file that is matched and
weight the summation accordingly. For example, if we match M sectors for a file out
of N total sectors in the catalog for that
file, then that file hit is worth M/N. We
sum all of the weighted file hits for each
diskprint and divide by the total number of
files in the catalog for that diskprint to give
a weighted file % for that diskprint. This
calculation is shown in Equation 2 below,
where WFP is weighted file %, NFM is the
number of file matches, the subscript DP indicates “per diskprint”, and the subscript F
indicates “per file”. The results of this calculation are in Appendix A under the heading
w file% (weighted file %).
NFM
X

WFPDP =

F =1

matched sectorsF
total sectorsF
files totalDP

(2)

Sample output for one of the test images
is shown in Appendix A. This Win7x64 test
image had Chrome installed, opened, closed,
and uninstalled, then the system was rebooted and the snapshot taken. The three
Chrome diskprints (for Chrome on WinXP,
Win7x32, and Win7x64) are the three highest valued hits based on both weighted sector % and weighted file % (the sort key in
c 2016 ADFSL
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the table). Other data are included in this
verbose output, to include the total sector
hashes and total files for each diskprint, as
well as hits and % of total for each.

4.

RESULTS

We generated eight test images, five containing the installation, use, and uninstallation
of a single catalog application and three containing the installation, use, and uninstallation of multiple catalog applications. We
also processed the four final day disk images
from the M57 Patents Scenario case. We also
processed WinXP, Win7x32, and Win7x64
images with no applications of interest installed and found no more than 1% matching
sectors per application.

4.1

Single-application test
cases

For each single application test case, we
started with a fresh install of the appropriate OS (WinXP, Win7x32, or Win7x64)
and mimicked the diskprint activity as described in the diskprint data, e.g., install,
open, close, uninstall, and reboot. These
test cases did not use NIST’s source media for the OS or application, and did not
strictly follow the details of activity performed by NIST personnel when creating the
diskprint images. Results from the postreboot snapshot of the seven single application test cases are summarized in Table
4, where only the top 5 weighted file % results are shown. In each test case, the installed/uninstalled application was correctly
identified and the weighted sector % and
weighted file % measures indicate a sharp
drop off for catalog applications that were
not present on that test image.
c 2016 ADFSL
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Multiple-application test
cases

Three test cases were constructed in a manner similar to the single application test
cases, but multiple applications were installed, used, and uninstalled, and multiple
reboots occurred. Two of these test cases
incorporated two applications and one incorporated three applications. Results from the
post-reboot snapshot of these three multiple
application test cases are summarized in Table 5. For these cases, the top 10 results
based on weighted file % are shown. In all
three cases, all installed/uninstalled applications are correctly identified, after which the
weighted file % drops off sharply.

4.3

M57 Patents Scenario
images

The M57 Patents Scenario is a publicly available data set. The scenario was created for
educational and research purposes by faculty and students at the Naval Postgraduate
School. The creators of the data set mimicked criminal activity in a lab environment
over the course of a month, capturing disk
and device images and network traffic during the exercise. Scenario documentation includes a description of the systems and networks involved, characters, and a storyline.
For our purposes, the final day snapshots are
sufficiently realistic system images, by merit
of having been physical machines operated
for a real-world month. Also, we have some
ground truth about installed and uninstalled
applications based on the scenario documentation (availability restricted to faculty at
accredited institutions), work by Roussev &
Quates (Roussev et al., 2012) that analyzed
the same images, and our own direct analysis of the scenario images. Results from
processing the final day (2009-12-11) images
for the four scenario users (Charlie, Jo, Pat,
and Terry) are summarized in Appendix B,
Page 121
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where the host OS is indicated after the system name.
In the M57 results of Appendix B, green
cells indicate true positives, which are confirmed installed or uninstalled programs
based on the scenario documentation, other
published analysis, and direct forensic examination of the scenario images. White cells
are true negatives, similarly verified. Red
cells indicate false positives, which we define
as weighted file % scores above the lowest
true positive. Blue cells are false negatives,
which we define as a known installed applications with a weighted file % lower than at
least one true negative. Yellow cells indicate
other OS versions of detected applications.
For the true positives, Python and Firefox
installations are confirmed for all four systems. For the Charlie system, Thunderbird
is also confirmed by the scenario documentation, and Invisible Secrets is suggested by
the scenario documentation (“...emails proprietary information steganographically hidden in JPEG image...”) and confirmed by
Roussev and Quates as well as a direct examination of the image. The presence of TrueCrypt on the Jo system, Advanced Keylogger on the Pat system, and Chrome on the
Terry system are all confirmed in the scenario documentation. Advanced Keylogger
is also confirmed in the scenario documentation to have been uninstalled prior to the
Pat 2009-12-11 image.
We examined the scenario images directly
using Autopsy 4.0.0 in an effort to understand the apparent false positives and the
lone false negative (eraser on the Terry image). A summary of our preliminary findings
is below. A more extensive analysis is underway to establish if these are in fact false
positives, or if some of them represent as yet
undocumented true positives. The results of
this analysis will be reported in future work.
(Charlie/Jo/Terry)Safari: Apple’s
Page 122

QuickTime and Apple’s software
update applications are present on
the Charlie and Jo systems and
may explain the Safari results due
to catalog artifacts in common
(Safari would include the Apple
software update application and
possibly QuickTime as well). The
Terry system also indicated Safari,
although at a lower level than the
Charlie and Jo systems, but the
Terry system does not show
indications of a QuickTime
installation.
(Jo/Pat/Terry)Thunderbird:
Thunderbird is known to have
been installed on the Charlie
system on 11-12-2009, but is not
documented or apparent on the
other three systems. It is possible
that Thunderbird was installed on
all four systems on 11-12-2009 but
immediately uninstalled on the
three non-Charlie systems.
(Pat/Terry) HxD: HxD may have
been installed and uninstalled
between snapshots, hence no
entries were found in locations like
Program Files. The Cygnus hex
editor was confirmed on the
Charlie system, so the scenario
operators are know to have
installed a hex editor, although a
different one than HxD detected
on the Pat and Terry systems.
(Terry)Winzip: Possibly due to
compression libraries bundled in
Windows Vista and also used by
Winzip, but not bundled in
Windows XP.
(Terry)Eraser: Likely due to a
difference in application versions
between the catalog and the M57
c 2016 ADFSL
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image. Most of the eraser sectors
in the catalog come from the
eraser.exe file, hence a minor
change in the compiled code would
prevent sector matches. The
eraser application has a small
number of files, hence is more
susceptible to such a variation
than other applications with large
numbers of files and hence
unchanged sectors across versions.
Of particular interest in the M57 results
is the successful detection of Advanced Keylogger on the Pat system after uninstallation
and continued use. Such detections are the
main goal of our work and is distinct from
other work such as Roussev and Quates that
relied on mid-scenario snapshots to detect
Advanced Keylogger. In contrast, our approach detected Advanced Keylogger using
only the final scenario snapshot, after Advanced Keylogger had been uninstalled and
the system used for five additional days. Figure 4 shows the presence and persistence of
Advanced Keylogger sector artifacts over the
life of the scenario. The data consists of 17
snapshots over 26 calendar days, where days
without snapshots are indicated by an asterisk along the X-axis of Figure 4. The vertical
axis in the graph, sector %, is the matched
sectors as a fraction of the total sectors associated with Advanced Keylogger in the
catalog. Advanced Keylogger was installed
between the 12/2 and 12/3 snapshots, and
uninstalled between the 12/4 and 12/7 snapshots. Subsequent system usage further destroyed probative sectors, yet our weighted
file % measure still detected Advanced Keylogger in the 12/11 snapshot (21.97% based
on the remaining 24 sectors from 8 different
files). We speculate that 100% of the catalog sectors were not matched in the 12/3
and 12/4 snapshots due to slight differences
in artifacts created during installation and
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use of Advanced Keylogger the different systems of the catalog and the M57 scenario.

Figure 4. Sector artifact persistence for Advanced Keylogger on Pat’s M57 system
One unresolved issue is to determine the
threshold at which an application should
be considered present or previously present.
While the M57 results might indicate a
weighted file % threshold of about 3%, the
contents of deleted files are modified (destroyed) over time, so a single threshold for
uninstalled applications is unlikely to exist.
However, we are conducting related work to
model the persistence of deleted files over
time under different artifact and system usage conditions. This related works aims to
provide a basis for asserting the implications
of a particular weighted file % for a specific
application after a known amount of time
and activity. Additionally, our catalog of 16
applications tested on the four images of the
M57 data set is not large enough to conclude
statistical significance. However, as a practical matter, the current use cases for our approach are (a) for an analyst to work down
the list in decreasing weighted file % score
until applications are no longer confirmed or
no longer of interest, or (b) to have a specific set of applications of interest and only
seek to confirm those in decreasing order of
weighted file %. Regarding the first use case,
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our M57 results indicate that present or previously present applications almost always
score higher than non-present or never installed applications. The second use case
also addresses part of the scalability question, in that our approach need not catalog
a great number of applications in order to be
of use, but rather only catalog applications
of interest to the analyst.

5. CONCLUSIONS
AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we leveraged an existing catalog of full-file artifacts from specific applications to detect and reason over matching
sectors recovered from media of interest. We
used these matching sectors to suggest past
uninstalled applications on test images and
the drive images of the M57 Patents Scenario. Our results suggest that:
• Partial file contents (traces) remain after files are deleted due to application
uninstallation
• These traces can be used to suggest the
past presence of uninstalled applications
Current approaches to determine prior application presence rely on intact artifact recovery, log analysis, Windows Registry analysis, and trace evidence analysis. Our approach complements these methods, especially when intact artifacts and traces are
not available and the Windows Registry has
been cleaned or is unavailable, e.g., on a nonWindows system.
Our approach requires that applications
of interest be processed into the catalog
prior to trace detection and computation.
While processing new applications is relatively straightforward, it does require resources as well as knowledge of, and access
to, applications of interest. Additionally,
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utilities that overwrite unallocated space
would likely defeat our approach as we rely
on fragments of deleted files residing in this
unallocated space. Our approach is also vulnerable to deliberate deception, as the placement of specific file fragments in the unallocated space of a device or image, or even the
creation and deletion of selected full-file artifacts, would cause spurious suggestion of
an application that in fact had never been
installed.
We are considering combining the
weighted sector and weighted file measures,
and also adding sector entropy and relative
partial artifact location on the media to our
measure of application presence calculation.
Additionally, we are examining methods
for more robust and precise noise reduction
at the point of catalog creation, and we
are considering sector differencing as an
alternative to file differencing.
Future
work will extend our approach to malware
applications and mobile platforms.
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Table 4. Single application test case results
Source Image: Chrome28-W7x64
diskprintName
w sector% w file%
Chrome28-W7x64
3.63% 21.46%
Chrome28-WinXP
1.16% 21.20%
Chrome28-W7x32
3.54% 16.26%
Winzip17pro-W7x32
0.46%
3.63%
Winzip17pro-W7x64
0.41%
3.53%
...
...
...
Source Image: Winrar5beta-W7x64
diskprintName
w sector% w file%
Winrar5beta-W7x32
8.39% 56.18%
Winrar5beta-W7x64
4.21% 32.80%
Winzip17pro-W7x32
0.44%
3.53%
Winzip17pro-W7x64
0.41%
3.46%
sdelete-W7x32
0.04%
0.14%
...
...
...
Source Image: sdelete-W7x64
diskprintName
w sector% w file%
sdelete-W7x64
7.75% 33.95%
sdelete-W7x32
7.75% 27.16%
Winzip17pro-W7x32
0.44%
3.52%
Winzip17pro-W7x64
0.41%
3.45%
Firefox19-W7x64
0.01%
1.67%
...
...
...
Source Image: UPX-W7x64
diskprintName
w sector% w file%
UPX-W7x32
2.97% 52.16%
UPX-W7x64
2.94% 52.16%
Winzip17pro-W7x32
0.44%
3.52%
Winzip17pro-W7x64
0.41%
3.45%
Firefox19-W7x64
0.01%
1.69%
...
...
...
Source Image: Firefox19-W7x64
diskprintName
w sector% w file%
Firefox19-WinXP
6.88% 57.32%
Firefox19-W7x32
6.42% 51.52%
Firefox19-W7x64
6.26% 47.25%
Winzip17pro-W7x32
0.44%
3.57%
Winzip17pro-W7x64
0.41%
3.48%
...
...
...
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Table 5. Multiple application test case results
Source Image: Firefox, Chrome, & Safari
diskprintName
w file%
Safari157-W7x32
94.32%
Safari157-WinXP
92.80%
Safari157-W7x64
57.12%
Firefox19-WinXP
46.57%
Firefox19-W7x32
42.83%
Firefox19-W7x64
37.73%
Chrome28-WinXP
22.10%
Chrome28-W7x64
12.88%
Chrome28-W7x32
9.84%
Winzip17pro-W7x32
3.62%
...
...
Source Image: Chrome & Firefox
diskprintName
w file%
Firefox19-WinXP
57.21%
Firefox19-W7x32
52.04%
Firefox19-W7x64
47.33%
Chrome28-W7x64
20.45%
Chrome28-WinXP
20.37%
Chrome28-W7x32
15.58%
Winzip17pro-W7x32
3.64%
Winzip17pro-W7x64
3.53%
Thunderbird2-WinXP
1.68%
Winrar5beta-W7x64
0.42%
...
...
SourceImage: WinRAR & WinZip
diskprintName
w file%
Winzip17pro-W7x64
35.60%
Winzip17pro-W7x32
34.88%
Winrar5beta-W7x32
9.97%
Winrar5beta-W7x64
9.29%
Firefox19-WinXP
2.66%
Firefox19-W7x64
2.60%
Firefox19-W7x32
2.23%
Thunderbird2-WinXP
1.49%
sdelete-W7x64
0.17%
Wireshark-W7x32
0.16%
...
...
Page 125

CDFSL Proceedings 2016

6.

Inferring Previously Uninstalled Applications from ...

REFERENCES

Collange, S., Dandass, Y. S., Daumas,
M., & Defour, D. (2009). Using graphics
processors for parallelizing hash-based
data carving. In System Sciences, 2009.
HICSS’09.
42nd Hawaii International
Conference on (pp. 1-10). IEEE.
Dandass, Y. S., Necaise, N. J., & Thomas,
S. R. (2008). An empirical analysis of disk
sector hashes for data carving. Journal of
Digital Forensic Practice, 2 (2), 95-104.
NPS-DEEP. (2015). Hashdb. Last accessed 10.4.15,
https://github.com/
NPS-DEEP/hashdb.

Roussev, V. (2010). Using purpose-built
functions and block hashes to enable small
block and sub-file forensics. digital investigation, 7, S13-S23.
Garfinkel, S., Nelson, A. J., & Young,
J. (2012). A general strategy for differential
forensic analysis. Digital Investigation, 9,
S50-S59.
Koppen, J., Gent, G., Bryan, K., DiPippo, L., Kramer, J., Moreland, M., &
Fay-Wolfe, V. (2013). Identifying Remnants
of Evidence in the Cloud. In Digital Forensics and Cyber Crime (pp. 42-57). Springer
Berlin Heidelberg.

Forte, D. V. (2004). The “Art” of log
correlation: Tools and Techniques for Correlating Events and Log Files. Computer
Fraud & Security, 2004(8), 15-17.

Laamanen, M., Nelson, A. (2014).
NSRL Next Generation - Diskprinting.
Forensics @ NIST, Gaithersburg, MD,
December 3, 2014. Last accessed 10.4.15,
http://www.nsrl.nist.gov/Documents/
Diskprints.pdf.

Foster, K. (2012).
Using distinct sectors in media sampling and full media
analysis to detect presence of documents
from a corpus (Doctoral dissertation,
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate
School).

Ligh, M. H., Case, A., Levy, J., & Walters,
A. (2014). The art of memory forensics:
detecting malware and threats in windows,
linux, and Mac memory. John Wiley & Sons.

Garfinkel, S. L. (2013). Digital media triage
with bulk data analysis and bulk extractor.
Computers & Security, 32, 56-72.

Nelson, A., Laamanen, M., Tebbutt,
J., Long, D. (2014) Indexing the Windows
Registry for Software Detection. The American Academy of Forensic Sciences 66th
Annual Scientific Meeting , February 20,
2014, Seattle, WA. Last accessed 10.4.15,
http://www.nsrl.nist.gov/Documents/
20140220%20Diskprint%20AAFS.pdf.

Garfinkel, S. L., & McCarrin, M. (2015).
Hash-based carving: Searching media for
complete files and file fragments with sector
hashing and hashdb. Digital Investigation,
14, S95-S105.

Nelson, A. J., Steggall, E. Q., & Long,
D. D. (2014). Cooperative mode: Comparative storage metadata verification applied
to the Xbox 360. Digital Investigation, 11,
S46-S56.

Garfinkel, S., Nelson, A., White, D., &

NIST.

Garfinkel, S. (2012).
Digital forensics
XML and the DFXML toolset. Digital
Investigation, 8 (3), 161-174.

Page 126

(2015).

Diskprint

Data

c 2016 ADFSL

Inferring Previously Uninstalled Applications from ...

CDFSL Proceedings 2016

Downloads.
Last accessed 10.4.15,
http://www.nsrl.nist.gov/dskprt/
sequence.html.
NIST. (2012). Recommendation for Applications Using Approved Hash Algorithms,
Special Publication 800-107 Revision 1.
2012. Last accessed 10.5.15. http://
csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/
800-107-rev1/sp800-107-rev1.pdf
Quick, D., & Choo, K. K. R. (2013).
Digital droplets: Microsoft SkyDrive forensic data remnants.
Future Generation
Computer Systems, 29 (6), 1378-1394.
Roussev, V., & Quates, C. (2012). Content triage with similarity digests: the M57
case study. Digital Investigation, 9, S60-S68.
Wong, L. W. (2007). Forensic analysis
of the Windows Registry. Forensic Focus, 1.
Woods, K., Lee, C. A., Garfinkel, S.,
Dittrich, D., Russel, A., & Kearton, K.
(2011).
Creating realistic corpora for
forensic and security education. ADFSL
Conference on Digital Forensics, Security
and Law.
Young, J., Foster, K., Garfinkel, S., &
Fairbanks, K. (2012). Distinct sector hashes
for target file detection. Computer, (12),
28-35.
Zobel, J., & Moffat, A. (1998).
Exploring the similarity space. In ACM SIGIR
Forum (Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 18-34). ACM.

c 2016 ADFSL

Page 127

CDFSL Proceedings 2016

Inferring Previously Uninstalled Applications from ...

Appendix A. SAMPLE ANALYSIS OUTPUT FOR
SOURCE IMAGE “CHROME WIN7X64”

diskprintName
Chrome28-W7x64
Chrome28-WinXP
Chrome28-W7x32
Winzip17pro-W7x32
Winzip17pro-W7x64
Firefox19-W7x32
Firefox19-WinXP
Firefox19-W7x64
Thunderbird2-WinXP
Winrar5beta-W7x64
Winrar5beta-W7x32
Safari157-WinXP
Safari157-W7x32
Safari157-W7x64
sdelete-W7x64
Wireshark-W7x32
sdelete-W7x32
OfficePro2003-WinXP
OfficePro2003-W7x32
OfficePro2003-W7x64
Wireshark-W7x64
eraser-W7x32
TrueCrypt63-WinXP
Python264-WinXP
AdvKeylogger-WinXP
InvSecrets21-WinXP
UPX-W7x32
HxD171-W7x32
UPX-W7x64
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sectors
found
66795
40831
66795
2186
2162
4183
4183
4184
17
9
9
573
573
575
1
51
1
1014
1014
1014
11
21
1
23
0
0
0
0
0

sectors
total
670051
1035098
686986
240229
262854
103341
96377
106270
68102
18328
9196
343824
316224
569645
642
171515
642
656354
1090216
1077126
209666
69984
24520
86287
4716
6689
1796
4774
1813

sec%
9.97%
3.94%
9.72%
0.91%
0.82%
4.05%
4.34%
3.94%
0.02%
0.05%
0.10%
0.17%
0.18%
0.10%
0.16%
0.03%
0.16%
0.15%
0.09%
0.09%
0.01%
0.03%
0.00%
0.03%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%

w
sec%
3.63%
1.16%
3.54%
0.46%
0.41%
0.59%
0.63%
0.57%
0.01%
0.01%
0.02%
0.02%
0.02%
0.01%
0.04%
0.01%
0.04%
0.02%
0.01%
0.01%
0.00%
0.02%
0.00%
0.01%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%

files
found
153
208
152
41
42
18
17
18
6
7
7
31
31
35
2
10
2
33
33
33
5
2
1
6
0
0
0
0
0

files
total
499
624
669
149
153
132
115
146
172
81
41
918
907
1504
4
617
5
2801
3800
3804
611
24
16
2355
23
19
19
12
19

file%
30.66%
33.33%
22.72%
27.52%
27.45%
13.64%
14.78%
12.33%
3.49%
8.64%
17.07%
3.38%
3.42%
2.33%
50.00%
1.62%
40.00%
1.18%
0.87%
0.87%
0.82%
8.33%
6.25%
0.25%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%

w
file%
21.46%
21.10%
16.26%
3.63%
3.53%
2.44%
2.40%
2.37%
1.09%
0.38%
0.38%
0.32%
0.30%
0.24%
0.17%
0.16%
0.14%
0.13%
0.11%
0.08%
0.02%
0.01%
0.01%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
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Appendix B.

M57 PATENTS SCENARIO RESULTS

Charlie (XP)

Jo (XP)

diskprintName

Legend
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w file%

diskprintName

w file%

Python264-WinXP

98.98%

Python264-WinXP

98.83%

InvSecrets21-WinXP

63.16%

TrueCrypt63-WinXP

50.00%

Thunderbird2-WinXP

61.00%

Thunderbird2-WinXP

24.73%

Safari157-W7x32

10.25%

Safari157-W7x32

11.35%

Safari157-WinXP

10.16%

Safari157-WinXP

11.26%

Safari157-W7x64

6.69%

Safari157-W7x64

7.37%

Firefox19-WinXP

3.26%

Firefox19-WinXP

3.24%

Firefox19-W7x32

2.77%

Firefox19-W7x32

2.74%

Firefox19-W7x64

2.50%

Firefox19-W7x64

2.62%

Chrome28-WinXP

2.11%

Chrome28-WinXP

2.15%

Winzip17pro-W7x64

2.08%

Chrome28-W7x64

2.03%

Chrome28-W7x64

2.02%

Chrome28-W7x32

1.52%

Chrome28-W7x32

1.52%

sdelete-W7x64

1.35%

Winzip17pro-W7x32

1.51%

Winzip17pro-W7x64

1.26%

sdelete-W7x64

1.35%

sdelete-W7x32

1.08%

sdelete-W7x32

1.08%

Winrar5beta-W7x64

0.95%

TrueCrypt63-WinXP

0.73%

Winrar5beta-W7x32

0.94%

Winrar5beta-W7x32

0.64%

Winzip17pro-W7x32

0.72%

Winrar5beta-W7x64

0.64%

OfficePro2003-WinXP

0.43%

OfficePro2003-WinXP

0.37%

OfficePro2003-W7x32

0.41%

OfficePro2003-W7x32

0.32%

OfficePro2003-W7x64

0.37%

OfficePro2003-W7x64

0.31%

Wireshark-W7x32

0.07%

Wireshark-W7x32

0.06%

HxD171-W7x32

0.04%

eraser-W7x32

0.01%

eraser-W7x32

0.02%

AdvKeylogger-WinXP

0.01%

Wireshark-W7x64

0.02%

Wireshark-W7x64

0.00%

AdvKeylogger-WinXP

0.01%

UPX-W7x32

0.00%

InvSecrets21-WinXP

0.00%

HxD171-W7x32

0.00%

UPX-W7x32

0.00%

UPX-W7x64

0.00%

UPX-W7x64

0.00%

True positive
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True negative

False positive

False negative

Different OS
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Pat (XP)

Terry (Vista)

diskprintName

Legend
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w file%

diskprintName

w file%

Python264-WinXP

98.91%

Python264-WinXP

85.52%

Thunderbird2-WinXP

24.94%

Thunderbird2-WinXP

27.81%

AdvKeylogger-WinXP

21.97%

Winzip17pro-W7x64

10.37%

HxD171-W7x32

8.39%

Winzip17pro-W7x32

10.05%

Firefox19-WinXP

3.17%

HxD171-W7x32

8.37%

Firefox19-W7x64

2.93%

Safari157-W7x32

5.46%

Firefox19-W7x32

2.78%

Safari157-WinXP

5.35%

Winzip17pro-W7x64

2.03%

Chrome28-WinXP

4.83%

Chrome28-WinXP

1.64%

Chrome28-W7x64

4.81%

Chrome28-W7x64

1.63%

Firefox19-WinXP

3.59%

Winzip17pro-W7x32

1.50%

Chrome28-W7x32

3.59%

Chrome28-W7x32

1.22%

Firefox19-W7x64

3.56%

TrueCrypt63-WinXP

1.22%

Firefox19-W7x32

3.55%

Winrar5beta-W7x64

0.85%

Safari157-W7x64

3.47%

Winrar5beta-W7x32

0.84%

Winrar5beta-W7x64

2.21%

Safari157-WinXP

0.62%

Winrar5beta-W7x32

2.19%

Safari157-W7x32

0.54%

TrueCrypt63-WinXP

0.97%

OfficePro2003-WinXP

0.47%

OfficePro2003-W7x32

0.39%

OfficePro2003-W7x32

0.45%

OfficePro2003-WinXP

0.35%

OfficePro2003-W7x64

0.42%

OfficePro2003-W7x64

0.35%

Safari157-W7x64

0.39%

Wireshark-W7x32

0.09%

Wireshark-W7x32

0.10%

eraser-W7x32

0.05%

Wireshark-W7x64

0.02%

Wireshark-W7x64

0.05%

eraser-W7x32

0.02%

AdvKeylogger-WinXP

0.03%

InvSecrets21-WinXP

0.00%

InvSecrets21-WinXP

0.00%

UPX-W7x32

0.00%

UPX-W7x32

0.00%

sdelete-W7x32

0.00%

sdelete-W7x32

0.00%

UPX-W7x64

0.00%

UPX-W7x64

0.00%

sdelete-W7x64

0.00%

sdelete-W7x64

0.00%

True positive

True negative

False positive

False negative

Different OS
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